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Abstract
We study the notion of informedness in a client-consultant setting. Using a software
simulator, we examine the extent to which it pays off for consultants to provide their
clients with advice that is well-informed, or with advice that is merely meant to appear
to be well-informed. The latter strategy is beneficial in that it costs less resources to
keep up-to-date, but carries the risk of a decreased reputation if the clients discover the
low level of informedness of the consultant. Our experimental results indicate that under
different circumstances, different strategies yield the optimal results (net profit) for the
consultants.
Keywords: well-informedness, argumentation, social simulation.
1 Introduction
When purchasing information, one wants to be sure of the quality of the information in
question. However, if one is not an expert oneself in the relevant domain, assessing the
quality of information can be difficult. For the sellers of information (which we will simply
refer to as “the consultants”) this provides an incentive for dishonesty. After all, gaining real
expertise costs significant efforts as well as time and money. However, if the consumer of
information (which we will refer to as “the client”) has difficulties assessing the quality of
the provided information, then why not pretend to have a higher level of expertise than one
actually has? As long as the chance that the client detects this dishonesty is low, a consultant
can charge the same price for his advice, yet spend less resources on maintaining up-to-date of
the state of the art. Moreover, the more consultants decide to take it easy, the less likely it is
that the clients will find out about it. This is because once a critical mass of consultants gives
ill-informed advice, it becomes more and more difficult for the clients to obtain the kind of
well-informed advice that they need in order to detect the ill-informedness of the other advice.
This implies that once a critical mass of low expertise consultants has become established,
the incentive for consultants to take it easy will increase, since the chance of discovery has
decreased.
The issue of low quality information has been studied in [8, 5]. What is new, however,
is that we have now developed a software simulator that is able to assess the pay-off for the
consultants of either a strategy of hard work or a strategy of taking it easy when it comes to
staying up to date with the state of the art. In particular, we are able to provide qualitative
insight on which strategy yields the most profitable results under which circumstances.
3
2 Argumentation and Informedness
The aim of this section is to examine how argumentation can play a role to examine the
concept of informedness, which can be seen as background theory for the remaining, more
practical part of this paper.
In standard epistemic logic (S5), informedness is basically a binary phenomenon. One
either has knowledge about a proposition p or one does not. It is, however, also possible to
provide a more subtle account of the extent to which one is informed about the validity of
proposition p. Suppose Alex thinks that Hortis Bank is on the brink of bankruptcy because
it has massively invested in mortgage backed securities. Bob also thinks that Hortis is on
the brink of bankruptcy because of the mortgage backed securities. Bob has also read an
interview in which the finance minister promises that the state will support Hortis if needed.
However, Bob also knows that the liabilities of Hortis are so big that not even the state
will be able to provide significant help to avert bankruptcy. From the perspective of formal
argumentation [7], Bob has three arguments at his disposal.
A: Hortis Bank is on the brink of bankruptcy, because of the mortgage backed securities.
B: The state will save Hortis, because the finance minister promised so.
C: Not even the state has the financial means to save Hortis.
Here, argument B attacks A, and argument C attacks B (see eq. 1). In most approaches
to formal argumentation, arguments A and C would be accepted and argument B would be
rejected.
A←− B ←− C (1)
Assume that Alex has only argument A to his disposal. Then it seems to regard Bob as more
informed with respect to proposition p (“Hortis Bank is on the brink of bankruptcy”) since
he has a better knowledge of the facts relevant for this proposition and is also in a better
position to defend it in the face of criticism.
The most feasible way to determine whether someone is informed on some given issue is
to evaluate whether he is up to date with the relevant arguments and is able to defend his
position in the face of criticism. One can say that agent X is more informed than agent Y if
it has to its disposal a larger set of relevant arguments.
We will now provide a more formal account of how the concept of informedness could be
described using formal argumentation. An argumentation framework [7] is a pair (Ar , att)
where Ar is a set of arguments and att is a binary relation on Ar . An argumentation
framework can be represented as a directed graph. For instance, the argumentation framework
({A,B,C}, {(C,B), (B,A)}) is represented in eq. 1.
Arguments can be seen as defeasible derivations of a particular statement. These defeasible
derivations can then be attacked by statements of other defeasible derivations, hence the
attack relationship. Given an argumentation framework, an interesting question is what is
the set (or sets) of arguments that can collectively be accepted. Although this question has
traditionally been studied in terms of the various fixpoints of the characteristic function [7],
it is equally well possible to use the approach of argument labelings [2, 4, 6]. The idea is that
each argument gets exactly one label (accepted, rejected, or abstained), such that the result
satisfies the following constraints.
1. If an argument is labeled accepted then all arguments that attack it must be labeled
rejected.
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2. If an argument is labeled rejected then there must be at least one argument that attacks
it and is labeled accepted.
3. If an argument is labeled abstained then it must not be the case that all arguments that
attack it are labeled rejected, and it must not be the case that there is an argument
that attacks it and is labeled accepted.
A labeling is called complete iff it satisfies each of the above three constraints. As an example,
the argumentation framework of eq. 1 has exactly one complete labeling, in which A and C
are labeled accepted and B is labeled rejected. In general, an argumentation framework has
one or more complete labelings. Furthermore, the arguments labeled accepted in a complete
labeling form a complete extension in the sense of [7]. Other standard argumentation concepts,
like preferred, grounded and stable extensions can also be expressed in terms of labelings [2].
In essence, one can see a complete labeling as a reasonable position one can take in
the presence of the imperfect and conflicting information expressed in the argumentation
framework. An interesting question is whether an argument can be accepted (that is, whether
the argument is labeled accepted in at least one complete labeling) and whether an argument
has to be accepted (that is, whether the argument is labeled accepted in each complete
labeling). These two questions can be answered using formal discussion games [9, 11, 1, 6].
For instance, in the argumentation framework of eq. 1, a possible discussion would go as
follows.
Proponent: Argument A has to be accepted.
Opponent: But perhaps A’s attacker B does not have to be rejected.
Proponent: B has to be rejected because B’s attacker C has to be accepted.
The precise rules which such discussions have to follow are described in [9, 11, 1, 6]. We say
that argument A can be defended iff the proponent has a winning strategy for A. We say
that argument A can be denied iff the opponent has a winning strategy against A.
If informedness is defined as justified belief, and justified is being interpreted as defensible
in a rational discussion, then formal discussion games can serve as a way to examine whether
an agent is informed with respect to proposition p, even in cases where one cannot directly
determine the truth or falsity of p in the objective world. An agent is informed on p iff it has
an argument for p that it is able to defend in the face of criticism.
The dialectical approach to knowledge also allows for the distinction of various grades of
informedness. That is, an agent X can be perceived to be at least as informed as agent Y
w.r.t. argument A iff either X and Y originally disagreed on the status of A but combining
their information the position of X is confirmed, or X and Y originally agreed on the status
of A and in every case where Y is able to maintain its position in the presence of criticism
from agent Z, X is also able to maintain its position in the presence of the same criticism.
When AF1 = (Ar1, att1) and AF2 = (Ar2, att2) are argumentation frameworks, we write
AF1 unionsq AF2 as a shorthand for (Ar1 ∪ Ar2, att1 ∪ att2), and AF1 v AF2 as a shorthand for
Ar1 ⊆ Ar2 ∧ att1 ⊆ att2. Formally, agent X is at least as knowledgeable about argument A
as agent Y iff:
1. A can be defended using AFX (that is, if X assumes the role of the proponent of A then
it has a winning strategy using the argumentation framework of X), A can be denied
using AFY (that is, if Y assumes the role of the opponent than it has a winning strategy
using the argumentation framework of Y ), but A can be defended using AFX unionsq AFY ,
or
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2. A can be denied using AFX , A can be defended using AFY , but A can be denied
AFX unionsqAFY , or
3. A can be defended using AFX and can be defended using AFY , and for each AFZ such
that A can be defended using AFY unionsq AFZ it holds that A can also be defended using
AFX unionsqAFZ ,
4. A can be denied using AFX and can be denied using AFY , and for each AFZ such that
A can be denied using AFY unionsqAFZ it holds that A can be denied using AFX unionsqAFZ .
Naturally, it follows that if AFY v AFX then X is at least as informed w.r.t. each argument
in AFY as Y .
In the example mentioned earlier (eq. 1) Alex has access only to argument A, and Bob
has access to arguments A, B and C. Suppose a third person (Charles) has access only to
arguments A and B. Then we say that Bob is more informed than Alex w.r.t. argument A
because Bob can maintain his position on A (accepted) while facing criticism from Charles,
where Alex cannot. A more controversial consequence is that Charles is also more informed
than Alex w.r.t. argument A, even though from the global perspective, Charles has the
“wrong” position on argument A (rejected instead of accepted). This is compensated by the
fact that Bob, in his turn, is more informed than Charles w.r.t. argument A. As an analogy,
it would be fair to consider Newton as more informed than his predecessors, even though his
work has later been attacked by more advanced theories.
3 Simulation
We developed a software-simulator in order to better understand the impact of a consultant’s
informedness on his profit. The simulator has the objective to reveal when it pays off for a con-
sultant to be ill-informed, i.e. less well-informed as is the state of the art. If ill-informedness
is more profitable for a consultant than being well-informed, the spread of outdated and
possibly wrong facts or arguments is preprogrammed. Of course, such a situation would be
harmful to our society, and so a study of its causes seems to be important.
In the following, we describe the simulator (Sect. 3.1), show results (Sect. 3.2) and discuss
these (Sect. 3.3).
3.1 The Simulator
In the first part of this section, we describe the client-consultant scenario that we aim to
simulate. We then detail the considered argumentation framework. Two different strategies
of the consultants concerning the acquisition of newly available information are defined af-
terwards, one representing well-informed consultants and the other representing ill-informed
consultants. Finally, we specify the procedure of how clients select their consultants.
3.1.1 Client-Consultant Scenario
The scenario is basically defined by a set of clients, a set of consultants, and a finite number
of rounds in each of which the clients seek advice from the consultants. In each round,
consultants acquire new information, either from other sources (researchers, analysts, etc.),
or do investigations on their own. We model this acquisition of information simply as fixed
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costs per piece of information; in our case, this information comes in the form of arguments
as we will see later. The more clients request a certain consultant’s advice, the lower his
price for a consultation can be. Note that this actually explains why the intermediary role of
consultants exists.
Clients are free to choose their consultant, and so select in each round the consultant that
they think is currently the most appropriate one. In our simulations, this selection is based
on price and reputation of the consultants as it will be detailed later.
3.1.2 Argumentation Framework
We consider the following argumentation structure consisting of Narg many arguments:
A1 ←− A2 ←− . . .←− ANarg . (2)
Here, any argument Ai (for 1 < i ≤ Narg) defeats its predecessor argument Ai−1. If Narg is
even, then all arguments Ai where i is even, are “in”, and all other arguments are “out”. If
Narg is odd, it is the other way around.
At the beginning of a simulation, only argument A1 is known to the consultants and only
this argument is known in the whole society, i.e. it represents the “state of the art”. To model
the discovery/emergence of new information, we make a certain number of new arguments
available to the consultants in each round. This represents the evolution of the state of the
art. The number of new arguments per round will be fixed for a simulation and is denoted
by ∆Narg. We assume that the consultants extend their already known chain of arguments
with new arguments always in a seamless manner, i.e. without gaps. This assumption was
made in order to be in line with argument games (such as described in [9, 11, 1]) where each
uttered argument is a reaction to a previously uttered argument, thus satisfying the property
of relevance [3].
For a better understanding, the following shows the structure of the chain of arguments
at any round of the simulation (k ≤ i must hold):
“state of the art”︷ ︸︸ ︷
A1 ←− . . .←− Ak︸ ︷︷ ︸
known to certain consult.
←− . . .←− Ai ←−
becoming available next round︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ai+1 ←− . . .←− Ai+∆Narg ←− . . .←− ANarg . (3)
Consultants generally want to provide the least amount of information needed for a con-
sultation, because this way they can give more consultations. However, consultants generally
want to give good advice at the same time, to increase their reputation. We assume that
consultants believe that the latest argument they know is the most justified one, because it
is closest to the current state of the art. As a consequence, in order to give good advice,
they only consult arguments that are compliant to the latest argument they possess, i.e. ar-
guments whose index has the same parity as the latest argument they know. To provide the
least amount of information at the same time, a rational consultant acts as follows: he pro-
vides the client with two arguments, if the latest argument known to the client is of the same
parity as the latest argument known to the consultant, and with one argument otherwise.
The latest argument known to the client is updated accordingly.
To keep things simple, the cost of an argument is set to a constant carg. So, to get the
knowledge about argument A10, the consultant has an overall expense of 10 · carg (recall
that arguments can only be acquired in a row). We write narg to denote the total number
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of arguments acquired by a specific consultant (where narg ≤ Narg). Thus, we model the
expenses E of a consultant as:
E = narg · carg . (4)
3.1.3 Strategies of the Consultants
We consider two types of consultants that deal differently with newly available arguments:
well-informed (wi): wi -consultants buy arguments as soon as these become available, since
they want to be always up-to-date.
ill-informed (ii): ii -consultants only buy arguments as to appear knowledgeable to the
clients. That is, as soon as they notice that a client is as informed as they are, or
even better informed, they buy a number of new arguments such that they know one
argument more than this client.
Clearly, ii -consultants can offer their consultations at a lower price. However, the reputation
of a consultant decreases with each consultation where the client turns out to be as informed
as the consultant – and this happens more often to ii -consultants.
The turnover of a consultant is defined by the sum of prices the consultant was paid. Let S
be the multiset enumerating all prices paid by clients up to a certain round. So, S represents
the consultations where the consultant actually was better informed than the client, and thus
was paid. Then the turnover T up to this point is defined as:
T =
∑
p∈S
p . (5)
Finally, the profit P of a consultant up to a certain round is the difference between his
turnover and his expenses so far:
P = T − E . (6)
3.1.4 Selection of a Consultant
In our simulations, clients rate consultants according to two criteria: the consultant i’s current
reputation ri and price pi. The two criteria are explained in more detail later in this section.
For now, it suffices to know that they are normalized to [0, 1]. To make both parameters
“positive”, the price pi will be expressed in the form of cheapness ci, i.e., ci = 1 − pi. This
way, both a high cheapness and a high reputation characterize a good consultant. A parameter
α ∈ [0, 1] defines which of the two criteria a client thinks is more important. Consequently, a
client chooses consultant i with a probability proportional to:
Pi := α · ci + (1− α) · ri . (7)
A high α favors the choice of cheaper consultants, while a low α favors the choice of more
reputable consultants.
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Price Let δ be the profit margin of a consultant, with δ ∈ [0,∞); then δ = 0.5 for example
represents a typical profit margin of 50%. Using a certain profit margin, a consultant i
computes his current price p′i:
p′′i = (1 + δ)
E
|S| . (8)
Here, E|S| is a simple estimate to provide cost recovery, where E models the expenses (see
eq. 4), and |S| is the number of successful consultations so far (see eq. 5). Still, no client
would choose a consultant that is more expensive than the acquisition of the information
itself. Hence, we limit the price to the cost of the two arguments that a consultant advises
at most (2 · carg).
Finally, we normalize the prices of all consultants to [0, 1]:
pi =
p′i −minj (p′j)
maxj (p′j)−minj (p′j)
. (9)
Reputation In our simulator, clients use a reputation system [10] to share their experience
about consultants. This allows clients to better estimate the trustworthiness of the consultants
and thus to better select their future consultants. We assume perfect conditions for the
reputation system, since this will make it even harder for ii -consultants to hold their ground.
These perfect conditions consist of:
• honest reporting of the clients,
• all clients have the same idea of how to fuse the experiences with consultants, and so a
global reputation score can be computed, and
• total information sharing, i.e., every client shares his experience with every other client.
The reputation system should be as simple as possible, and the only requirement we
have is that it measures a consultant’s performance relatively to the performance of other
consultants. We consider two different reputation systems. A very basic system (R1), and a
more sophisticated one (R2).
Reputation System R1 In the reputation system R1, a client is satisfied with a con-
sultation if the consultant is better informed than the client. This is motivated by the fact
that clients cannot question the correctness of the consultants arguments since they are less
well informed. So, any consultation where the consultant is better informed than the client
counts as a positive experience with that consultant. Consultations where this is not the
case count as negative experiences. The clients share their experience and maintain for each
consultant i a global counter n+i of positive experiences, and a global counter n
−
i of negative
experiences. Then an intermediate reputation score is computed as follows:
r′i = n+i − n−i . (10)
To bring these scores into [0, 1], we normalize the intermediate values of all consultants and
get the final global reputation score ri:
ri =
r′i −minj (r′j)
maxj (r′j)−minj (r′j) . (11)
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This basic reputation score has the desired property: the overall performance of a consultant
is measured relatively to the performance of other consultants.
Reputation System R2 In this reputation system, a client reactively decides about
positive and negative experiences. Each client assumes that the latest argument he was
advised on by a consultant is correct. Then for all consultants i that advised him with a
conflicting argument in the past (i.e., where the parity of the argument’s index is different),
each client increases the global value n−i , and for all consultants that advised a compatible
argument, n+i is increased. As in R1, if the consultant is not more informed than the client,
n−i is additionally increased. Given n
+
i and n
−
i , the computation of ri is the same as in R1.
3.2 Results
On the following pages we show simulation results to compare the profit of wi -consultants
and ii -consultants for different parameters. We conducted the experiments by computing
the mean and standard deviation of the consultants’ profit over 28 simulation runs. Each
simulation consisted of 27 rounds. We used 210 clients and 27 consultants.
We varied the following parameters:
• the number of arguments becoming available each round (∆Narg ∈ {2, 3, 4(, 5)}),
• the fraction of ii -consultants (fii ∈ {0.1, 0.5, 0.9}),
• the profit margin (δ ∈ {0.1, 0.5}), and
• the factor α that regulates the importance of price and reputation in the clients’ con-
sultant selection process (α ∈ [0, 1], shown on the x-axis).
The figures on the left depict simulations with δ = 0.1, those on the right depict simulations
with δ = 0.5. Furthermore, we conducted all experiments for the two different reputation
systems R1 and R2. At the end of this section, we provide an analysis of the shown results.
(Note: For making it easier to compare the different figures, we start on the next page.)
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3.2.1 Using R1
• Information rate ∆Narg = 2:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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• Information rate ∆Narg = 3:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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• Information rate ∆Narg = 4:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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3.2.2 Using R2
• Information rate ∆Narg = 2:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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• Information rate ∆Narg = 3:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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• Information rate ∆Narg = 4:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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• Information rate ∆Narg = 5:
– Fraction of ii -consultants fii = 0.1:
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3.3 Analysis
First of all, it is evident that in some scenarios ii -consultants have a higher profit than wi -
consultants. We can conclude that under certain circumstances it is more profitable for a
consultant to follow the ii -strategy than being well-informed. Some more detailed observa-
tions about the results are described in the following.
3.3.1 Using R1
One can see that if reputation is used as the only criterion for selection (α = 0), wi -consultants
are always better off. As the price of the consultants gets more important, the profit of
ii -consultants generally increases, whereas the profit of wi -consultants decreases. In most
settings the wi -consultants’ profit decreases so much that at some point it falls below the
profit of the ii -consultants. Besides, ii -consultants seem to generally benefit from a low profit
margin (δ).
An increasing fraction of ii -consultants causes the curves of both ii -consultants and wi -
consultants to have a lower slope value (have a look at the values on the y-axis to verify that).
As a result, the point where the two curves intersect moves to the left, i.e. the ii -strategy
becomes more effective.
A varying ∆Narg impacts also the slope of the curves, as well as their distance. Consider
for instance the variation of ∆Narg for otherwise fixed parameters: R1, fii = 0.5 and δ = 0.5
(figures on the right side). For ∆Narg = 2, the ii -strategy is the better strategy for α ≥ 0.45;
for a ∆Narg of 3 or 4, the wi -strategy is always better – for 3 very distinct, and less distinct
for 4.
3.3.2 Using R2
The same observations as for R1 can also be made for R2. The main difference lies in the
shape of the curves. In particular, the shape of the lines depends on the parity of ∆Narg.
This can be explained as follows. If an even number of new arguments gets available each
round, wi -consultants will always advice even arguments; however, if DeltaNarg is odd, they
switch each round between advising even and odd arguments. Since clients retrospectively
judge consultants in R2, they will find in the odd case that wi -consultants contradict each
other over time, which will never be the case in the even case. So, in the even case, clients will
decrease the reputation of a wi -consultant only if their most recent consultant was ill-informed
and consulted an odd argument. This explains also why the profit of wi -consultants is much
higher and the profit of ii -consultants is much lower in the even cases (also in comparison to
R1).
Apart from these specific shapes, in the same way as for R1 we can observe that the
ii -strategy yields in many settings higher profits.
4 Conclusion & Future Work
Our simulations suggest that at least four factors have an impact on the profitability of being
ill-informed:
• the clients’ balancing act of choosing a consultant according to his reputation or his
price (α),
18
• the fraction of ill-informed consultants in the set of consultants (fii),
• the speed with which new information enters the system and becomes available to
consultants (∆Narg), and
• the profit margin of the consultants (δ).
In our simulations, a high α and a high fii made it generally less profitable for consultants
to be well-informed. The observation that an increasing fractions of ii -consultants increases
their payoff, raises the problem of consultants that follow the crowd, even if this means to
stay ill-informed.
The simulated model in this work is certainly simplifying the complexity of reality. There
are many ways for making it more realistic. For instance, the price computation given by eq.
8 is purely reactive; it does not exploit the fact that a lower prices would attract more clients
and so could be used in a proactive manner. Still, since all consultants computed their price
in the same way, it is not clear whether a more complex approach would make the ii -strategy
less profitable. This is subject to future research. Also, our consultants pursued two basic
strategies (acquiring all arguments becoming available, and acquiring only as needed); this
can be extended to more sophisticated strategies, e.g. to be a wi -consultant for a certain time
to boost the reputation, and then become ii -consultant. Furthermore, the impact of publicity
campaigns is completely ignored and would be an interesting continuation of our research.
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